Taxes and Share Valuation in Competitive Markets by Smith, Vernon L.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Economics Faculty Articles and Research Economics
1969
Taxes and Share Valuation in Competitive Markets
Vernon L. Smith
Chapman University, vsmith@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Vernon L. “Taxes and Share Valuation in Competitive Markets.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 51.1 (1969): 96-99.
Taxes and Share Valuation in Competitive Markets
Comments
This article was originally published in Review of Economics and Statistics, volume 51, issue 1, in 1969.
Copyright
MIT Press
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/21
96 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
Table 1 below lists the series used, their source 
and the results of the spectral estimates. The results 
of the harmonic trend version, as with the Canadian 
data, are generally favourable to the hypothesis 
with long cycles indicated in about three-fifth of 
the series, including most of the more important 
ones such as GNP, NNP, investment, employment, 
construction, prices, etc. The indication of a peak 
at 40 years in population and immigration, two very 
important variables in theoretical discussions on 
long cycles, likely reflects a very strong trend in 
these series which has been only partially removed. 
Again, the growth-rate version is extremely sym- 
pathetic toward the hypothesis, indicating long 
swings in 34 of the 44 series. This is likely the 
most significant result since taking first differences 
is currently the most popular method of trend elimi- 
nation among long-swing students. It will also be 
noted that the period of the indicated swing in 
growth rates is shorter than that for deviations from 
trend. This conforms with results obtained by other 
workers, in the United States and Canada, using 
less sophisticated techniques. Those working with 
growth rates using some sort of moving average have 
found long cycles to be about 14 years in duration 
while those applying the same sort of method to 
deviations from trend have found long swings which 
average about 22 years. 
Thus, the overall results suggest that there are, 
in fact, long swings in the deviations from trend of 
a significant number of important time series, con- 
trary to the findings of earlier spectral analysts like 
Adelman and Hatanaka and Howrey who found 
no evidence of long cycles in the series they tested. 
Given the results of Bird et al.8 which cast serious 
doubt on the reliability of the methods which have 
traditionally been used for the analysis of long 
swings, spectral analysis offers the most reliable 
and sophisticated method for investigating the 
existence of this phenomenon. While many may 
feel that their belief in long cycles has been vin- 
dicated by this note, we might add a note of caution 
that any chronologies of long swings based on the 
old techniques are still useless, given the biases 
uncovered by Bird et al. Not only existence, but 
chronology, will have to be the object of new 
techniques. 
8 Roger C. Bird, Meghnad J. Desai, Jared J. Enzler and 
Paul Taubman, "'Kuznets Cycles' in Growth Rates: The 
Meaning," Indian Economic Review, VI (May 1965), pp. 
229-239. 
TAXES AND SHARE VALUATION IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 
Vernon L. Smith 
This paper extends the fundamental theorem of 
share (or capital) valuation [1, 2, 3], under con- 
ditions of certainty and purely competitive markets, 
to allow for the distinction between capital gains 
and income in the taxation of personal income. The 
objective is to develop the theorem for the tax case 
in a form general enough to allow for corporations 
both currently and not currently paying a dividend. 
However, the general derivation is sufficiently 
tedious to warrant a presentation which begins with 
less general cases. Accordingly, we will first develop 
the share valuation equation for a continuous dis- 
count version of the taxless case for corporations 
either paying or not paying a dividend. Then we 
turn to the effect of income and capital gains taxes 
for corporations currently paying a dividend; and 
finally the more general case. The derivations will 
be simplified by assuming a constant rate of interest 
over time, but all the theorems can be extended to 
deal with foreseen changes in interest over time. 
I Share Valuation in the Absence of Taxes 
In a world without risk or taxes, the competitive 
market value of a corporation's outstanding com- 
mon stock V(t), at time t, must equal the present 
worth or capitalized value at t of the future divi- 
dend payments of the corporation. Suppose the 
corporation is not currently paying a dividend, but 
it is known that at time t* (i.e., t* - t years in 
the future) dividends will begin, and be paid at 
an annual rate D(r) > O, r : tO. If r' is the con- 
tinuous equilibrium force of interest (equal also to 
the marginal productivity of capital), then the 
market value of the corporation is 
V(t) = 
ft D(r) e-r (T-t*) dr, if t < t1 
D(T) et (TDt) dT, if t : t*. 
dV (t) Differentiating (1), to evaluate V(t) d , and 
then substituting from (1), gives 
V(t) = { /r V(t), if t < t* 
r' V(t) -D(t), if t t* (2) 
Equation (2) constitutes a continuous form of the 
fundamental theorem of share valuation, derived 
by Samuelson [3], for the case t - t*, in the con- 
text of capital-income theory and by Modigliani 
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and Miller [2, p. 412] in the context of share 
valuation theory. Thus, for a corporation not yet 
paying a dividend, its market value rises at a 
percentage rate equal to the instantaneous return 
on capital (equal to the market rate of interest) 
until dividend payments begin. Thereafter, share 
value increases at a percentage rate equal to the 
difference between the return on capital and the 
percentage dividend yield i.e., r' (t) - V (). 
V (t) 
II Taxes and Share Values for Dividend-Paying 
Corporations 
Assume next that all investors in the shares of a 
given corporation are subject to a personal income 
tax on dividends, and a tax at a different rate on 
capital gains realized over holding periods of at 
least T years.2 Let xi be the proportion of the cor- 
poration's stock held by investors in the ith mar- 
ginal income tax bracket. Let the marginal income 
tax rate in the ith bracket be ai, and the marginal 
capital gains (or loss) tax rate be bi. After tax 
dividend income is thus X,D(T) - X1aiD(r) at 
time T for investors in the ith bracket. If there are 
n brackets the total after tax dividend income of 
the corporation's stock holders is aD(T), where 
7) ~~~~~~n 
a = XAj.(I -ai) =1 i> 
Similarly, total after tax capital gains income, on 
a gain of V(t + T) - V(t), is ,B[V(t + T) - 
V(t)], where 
n n 
A= Xj iA(1-bi) = - ibi. 
i=1 i=1 
We assume no change in the income distribution of 
stock holders over time so that a and /8 are inde- 
pendent of t. 
If the after tax force of interest is r, the valua- 
tion formula corresponding to (1) for a dividend 
paying corporation is 
(t+T 
V(t) = J aD(T)e-r(T t) dT 
+ 8[V(t + T) - V(t)]e-rT 
+ V(t)e-rT. (3) 
In equilibrium share value is the present worth of 
the net return from dividends and capital gains plus 
capital recovery (the three terms on the right). 
When the equality in (3) holds, an investor 
would be indifferent between holding a share in 
V(t) and lending the equivalent sum at interest, r. 
If V(t) exceeded the after tax discounted value of 
dividends and capital, then shares would be over- 
valued, and investors could gain by selling their 
holdings and lending at interest (or would elect to 
lend at interest in place of purchasing shares). This 
would depress share values, and lower the interest 
rate. The process would continue causing shares to 
be more attractive and lending to be less attractive 
until the equality held in (3). Similarly, if V(t) 
was below the discounted value on the right, shares 
would be purchased, and funds borrowed, increasing 
share values and interest rates until the equality 
held. 
In a perfect capital market, with foreseen divi- 
dends and capital gains, it is also the case, in 
equilibrium, that no investor would desire to realize 
a capital gain after a holding period of less than T. 
If he did, the gain would be taxed as income at a 
higher rate than if the holding period is T or more. 
He would therefore find it preferable to borrow to 
satisfy any current cash needs in excess of current 
income. For holding periods in excess of T, he 
would be indifferent between selling shares, and 
borrowing to raise money, as the two alternatives 
would have identical effects upon his asset position. 
It follows, that equilibrium requires the market to 
continuously discount the after tax capital gain 
,/[V(t + T) - V(t)], which is potentially realiz- 
able T years in the future. 
We first collect terms in V(t), and write (3) in 
the form 
1 Equations (1) and (2) generalize very easily when the 
interest rate r'(u), is a forseen function of time, u. Then 
F t* T- f 
ft 00 r t* 
e f t*D (T) e dr, if t < t* 
(1') V(t) = T 
r0 tt7d 
ft D(T)e dr if t t* 
and 
- 
{ r'(t) V(t) - D(t) , if t t*. 
If the number of shares, S, is constant over time then of 
course share price change is just P(t) = V(t)IS. If the 
number of shares outstanding, S(t), varies over time we 
let V(t) = P(t) S(t), and D(T) = d(T) S(T), where d(T) 
is per share dividend yield. Since V(t) = P(t) S(t) + 
P(t) S(t), (2') takes the more general form 
f [r(t) - I P(t) ift<t* 
(2") __t S(t) 
l[r(t)-5 ( ) gP(t) -d(t) , if t ` t*, 
where S(t)/S(t)' is the annual percentage stock dividend, 
which of course, "waters" the per share price but has no 
effect, in a perfect market, on the market value of the firm. 
2 In the United States dividend receipts are taxed at 
progressive rates, while capital gains realized over holding 
periods of six months or more (T = 1/2, if the time unit 
is a year) are tazed at one-half the income tax rate up to 
a maximum of 25 per cent. 
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V(t) [1 - (1 - 3)e-rT] 
rt+T 
= f tT aD(T)e-r(T-t) dr 
+ ,/V(t + T)e-rT. (4) 
Now, by iteration of (4) we can derive an ex- 
pression for V(t) as an infinite sum (or' finite, if we 
had assumed a finite market discount horizon [2, 
pp. 421-422]) entirely in terms of the future divi- 
dend stream. This is because, ultimately, V(t) is 
determined only by the discounting of future divi- 
dend yield. Thus, at t + (k - 1)T, k = 1,2,3, ..., 
the market value of the firm must be given by 
V [ t + (k-1 ) T] in the expression 
V[t + (k - 1)T] [1 - (1- 3)e-rT] 
tt+kT 
J t+(k-1)T aD(T)e-r[E-t-(k-1)T1 dT 
+ /3V(t + kT), k = 1,2,3.... 
By iterative substitution for V(t + T), V(t + 2T), 
... into (4), we get 
00 
V(t) = I a/3k-1[1 - (1-/.)e-rT]-k e-r(k-l)T 
k=1 
tt+kT 
J t+ (k-l)T D (rT) e-r[T-t-(k-1)T] dr, (5) 
if the sum converges. Differentiating and then 
substituting from (5) gives 
*00 
V(t) = I a/3k-l[i- (1-,8)e-rT] -k e-r(k-l)T 
k=1 
{ D[t + kT]e-rT 
-D[t + (k - 1)T]} + rV(t), (6) 
which provides the fundamental valuation theorem 
for arbitrary tax law parameters a, /8 and T, where 
0 < a 1, 0 </3 -- 1, and T > 0. If a = /8 = 1 
(no taxes), equation (6) reduces to (2) for the 
dividend paying corporation. 
III Extension to Non Dividend-Paying Corporations 
Suppose the corporation at time t is not paying a 
dividend, but it is known that dividends will begin 
at t* = t + NT +0T>0 0 0 -T- >T, N an 
integer. That is, measured in terms of multiples of 
the holding period T (which separates "short" from 
"long-term" capital gains) dividends will begin 
between t + NT and t + (N + 1)T, at a point 
which divides that interval into subintervals a with 
no dividend, and 1 - 0 with positive dividends. 
Diagrammatically: 
TT 
e - T - T 
t t+NT t* t +(N+I)T t+(N+2)T 
It follows that share value is determined at t by 
the discounting of the potential capital gains (loss) 
over the N periods of length T, and the discounting 
of both dividends and potential capital gains (loss) 
thereafter. 
The expression in V(t) corresponding to (4) is 
now 
V(t) [1 - (1-/3)e-rT] = /3V(t+T)e-rT. (7) 
By iteration, 
V(t+T) [1- (1- 8)e-rT] 
8 /3V(t + 2T)e-rT 
V[t + (N- 1)T] [1 - (1-_8)e-rT] 
= /3V(t + NT)e-rT 
V[t + NT] [1- (1- 8)e-rT] 
J'e-r(t*-NT-t) 
(t+ (N++1)T J t* aD(T)e-rT-tN*) dT 
+ /3V[t + (N + 1)T]e-rT 
V[t + (N + k)T]I1 1_ )-T 
rt+ (N+k+l)T 
Jt +(N +k) T aD (T) e r[,r-t-(N+ k) TI dr 
+ /3V[t + (N + k + 1)T]e-rT. 
By iterative substitution for V(t + T), V(t + 2T), 
.. ., V[t + (N + k)T], ... we can solve for V(t): 
V(t) = a/iN [1 - (1-,#)e-rT]-(N+l) Jt+ (N+1)T 
D(T)e-r(T-t) dr 
00 
+ I a/3N+k [1 - (1-/)e-rT]-(N+k+1) 
k=1 
(t+ (N+k+1)T J D(T)e-r(T-t) dT, (8) 
t+ (N+k)T 
provided that the sum converges. Differentiating 
and substituting as before: 
V(t) = a/iN [1 - (1-,8)e-rT]-(N+l) 
D[t + (N + 1)T]e-r(N+1)T 
00 
+ I a/3N+k [1 - (1-,8)e-rT]-(N+k+l) 
k=1 
e-(N+k)rT { D[t + (N+k+l)T]e-rT 
- D[t + (N+k)T] } + rV(t). (9) 
For t < t* (current dividends zero), the tax- 
generalized fundamental theorem of share valuation 
is given by (9); for t - t* (current dividends 
positive) it is given by (6). Mathematically, what 
we have done in (8) and (9) is treat explicitly the 
problem of a discontinuous dividend stream. If we 
let f(T) 0 be the dividend stream without any 
continuity restrictions, then it is a straightforward 
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matter (albeit tedious) to write conditions like (8) 
and (9) for any given f(T) function. By a suitable 
partitioning of the domain of integration, these ex- 
pressions can be written for any stuttering flow of 
dividends; for example, 
O, t - T < t* 
A 
f(T)= D*(T) > 0O t* -- T< t 
0, t 
-- 
T < t** 
D**(T) > 0, t** :` T. 
IV Share Valuation Under Constant Growth 
The above formulas are not very practical tools 
until we postulate special forms for D(T). If the 
corporation's dividend growth rate is a constant, g, 
then the dividend functions in (5) and (6) are 
D (T) =D (t) eg('r-t) 
D[t + kT] =D(t) egkT 
D[t + (k - 1)T] =D(t) eg(k-1)T 
Substituting in (5), and evaluating the sum, we 
obtain 
V (t) = R t) r > g (10) 
where 
a[ - e-(g-r)T] e(g-r)T 
1 - (1-,8)e-rT 
R - 1 , and 
1 - (1 - ) (1-)e-rT] -1 e(g-r)T 
[3[l - (1 -8) e-rTj-1e(g--r!T < 
Similarly, evaluating (6), 
V(t) +QRD(t) + rV(t) 
QRgD(t) (11) 
g-r 
Observe that in a taxless world, with a = 3 = 1, 
QR = - 1, and the expression (10) is just the 
present worth of a stream of receipts growing at 
the constant rate g < r from the initial value D(t). 
Making the above substitution for D(T) = D (t*) 
eg(T-t*) in (8), 
D (t*) 8N[1 -( ) e-rT]-N e(g-r)NT 
V(t) = - r 
g-r 
{Q [e(g-r)T - 1] -1 
[eg(t+T-t*)-rT - e-(g-r)NT-r(t*-t)] 
+ Qeg(t-t*)(R - 1) } (12) 
Note that when N = 0 and t = t* (12) reduces to 
(10). 
Finally, making the growth function substitutions 
in (9) we have 
V(t) = D(t*) /3N[1 - (1-3)e-rT]-N 
e(g-r)NT-g (t -t*) 
Q { [1 - e-(g-r)Tl-I + R - 1 } 
+ rV(t) (13) 
where V(t) is given by (12). 
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COMMENT ON THE "H" CONCENTRATION MEASURE AS 
A NUMBERS-EQUIVALENT 
M. A. Adelman 
The H concentration measure (so designated 
because it was independently devised by 0. C. Her- 
findahl and A. 0. Hirschmann) is defined as the 
sum of squared percentages of market. (Thus with 
three firms of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2, H would be 0.25 + 
0.09 + 0.04 = 0.38.) It has not had a very wide 
use. In this note we (1) derive it from some 
general premises, and (2) show how it can be in- 
terpreted as a "numbers-equivalent" 1 in any given 
market. (3) An important virtue both for com- 
puting and for using it is the quick convergence to 
a limit. Explaining its virtues will also show (4) 
its principal weakness. 
I 
Consider the very familiar cumulative concen- 
tration curve. On the vertical (y) axis we have 
from zero to 100 per cent of the industry. On the 
1 Robert L. Bishop, "Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities, and 
Market Relationships," American Economic Review, 42, pp. 
779-803, especially 788-789; and "Comment," 43, pp. 918- 
19. Strictly speaking, Bishop's paper was concerned with the 
relationship of only two firms. I consider it as the classic 
statement of the oligopoly problem involving any number 
of firms. 
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